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Abstract: With the 40th anniversary of the passage of the Endangered Species Act it 
becomes necessary to review the history of this act and its impact on achieving its goals of 
preventing the extinction of endangered species. Many environmentalists have argued that the 
only way to prevent the extinction of animals, most notable Elephant populations in Africa, is 
through government management and ownership. However, we argue in this paper that the 
best solution to preserving endangered species is creating a more free market- oriented system 
of private property rights over animals and land use.  
 Our argument is two-fold, first - that without a true market with effective property 
rights we encounter a tragedy of the commons where there is no effective incentive among 
individual actors to protect endangered animals. Second is the unintended consequences of 
regulation by government actors that distort the incentives of individuals to protect 
endangered animals. By instituting a more market oriented way of governing all animals 
would significantly benefit by reducing the tragedy of the commons problem and the 
unintended consequences of government management. Using examples from the American 
buffalo, African elephants, fish farms, and farm animals we try to build the case for more free 
market-oriented policies in achieving the goal of species preservation. 
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Резюме: С настъпване на 40-годишнината от приемането на Закона за 
застрашените видове става необходимо да се направи исторически преглед на този акт и 
неговото въздействие върху постигането на целите по предотвратяване на изчезването 
на застрашените видове. Много природозащитници твърдят, че единственият начин да 
се предотврати изчезването на животни, сред които най-вече се отличават популациите 
на слонове в Африка, е чрез управление и собственост от страна на правителството. 
Въпреки това, в тази разработка ние твърдим, че най-доброто решение за запазване на 
застрашените видове е създаването на по-свободна пазарно-ориентирана система за 
правото на частна собственост върху животни и използването на земята. 
Нашият аргумент е двупосочен: първо, че без истински пазар с ефективни права 
за собственост, ние се натъкваме на трагедията на обществената собственост, където 
няма ефективен стимул сред индивидуалните защитници  на застрашените животински 
видове. На второ място са  непредвидените последици при регулация от страна на 
държавните представители , където се наблюдава изкривяване на стимулите, които да 
насърчават индивидуалните защитници на застрашените животни. Чрез въвеждане на 
по-пазарно ориентиран начин на управление всички животински видове ще бъдат 
значително облагоприятствани чрез намаляването на проблемите, свързани с об-
ществената собственост и непредвидените последици от държавното управление. 
Използвайки примерите с американския бизон, африканските слонове, рибовъдните 
стопанства и селскостопанските животни, ние се опитваме да изградим по- свободна 
пазарно-ориентирана политика в постигането на целта за опазване на животинските 
видове.  
 
Ключови думи: изчезване на животински видове, частна собственост, 
трагедията на обществената собственост 
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 Of the world’s 1.7 million species that were evaluated in 2010, 17,315 are 
listed as endangered or in critical condition (Conservation of Biodiversity). Wild life 
and animal extinction are often cited as a problem that needs to be addressed by 
government intervention and regulation. However, another approach exists to solve 
this challenge: privatization of wildlife and the environment in which they live. This 
is not an obvious solution. To many, it appears far too simple because they believe 
that animal extinction is the result of human greed and capitalism. Whether it is 
hunting elephants in Africa or destroying the rainforest in Brazil, the problem of 
extinction appears at first glance to be one that would require mechanisms of 
preventing such harmful human activity.1 The only obvious mechanism that readily 
comes to mind is that of state regulation and prohibition. 
 However, we argue that privatization can actually provide a much better 
solution than heavy-handed government intervention. We reason that markets produce 
the most efficient outcomes. For them to exist, however, people must be able to own 
the market’s goods – in this case, the endangered animals. The market has a very 
effective way of self-regulating the problems of resource allocation when property 
rights are fully enforceable and clearly defined.  
 Let us first identify the problem of species extinction. What is the optimal 
amount of species, we ask? Extinction is only a problem if it reduces human welfare.2 
This can occur if the extinction of a seemingly insignificant species disrupts the food 
chain and leads to an ecological disaster that threatens the survival of species of more 
importance.  
 Another negative could simply be the loss of being able to enjoy the extinct 
animal. For instance, safaris might be less fun without the cheetah; the loss of a 
certain type of bird would make an area less beautiful. Conversely, there can be 
positives to the extinction of species – for instance, the mosquito. Fang (2010) writes 
that  
Malaria infects some 247 million people worldwide each year, and kills nearly 
one million. Mosquitoes cause a huge further medical and financial burden by 
spreading yellow fever, dengue fever, Japanese encephalitis, Rift Valley fever, 
Chikungunya virus and West Nile virus. Then there’s the pest factor: they form 
swarms thick enough to asphyxiate caribou in Alaska and now, as their 
numbers reach a seasonal peak, their proboscises are plunged into human flesh 
across the Northern Hemisphere.  
Given its harmful deeds, the mosquito might be a species that we should try to kill 
and make extinct.3  
                                                 
1 We adopt the perspective that the optimal amount of copper, corn, and cabooses is that which 
maximizes human welfare, and see no good reason not to regard animals in precisely the same way. 
2 In some quarters, this would be a controversial statement. Some scholars maintain that our 
brothers of field and stream have intrinsic value, not only instrumental, for our purposes. Some go so 
far as to claim that animals have rights. If so, the deer would have a valid legal case against the wolf 
that attacks it. QED. 
3 On the other hand, it might pay for some university biology departments or pharmaceutical 
companies to keep these species safe under controlled circumstances, the former for pure research, the 
latter in case a positive use is ever found for them. But this decision would best be made by profit 
seekers. If it is done by government, it runs counter to Sowell’s insight: “It is hard to imagine a more 
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 Another example of how extinction could be positive is in the realm of a virus. 
For instance, killing the small pox virus was an immeasurable positive event for the 
humanity. According to Animal Planet, 
while it’s incredibly hard for most people to fathom, extinction can indeed be a 
positive thing. The most notable examples of positive extinctions lie in the 
realm of microorganisms and viruses. Smallpox, for example, was a major 
threat all around the world for much of human history until vaccine 
distribution helped fight it off.  
Rather than expending resources to protect all species and prevent all extinctions, we 
must focus on deciding which species to protect and, more importantly, on how to 
protect them.  
 We believe privatization is the best answer. By creating a market for animals, 
all of them, we allow ownership of endangered species. In such a market, the value of 
an animal will rise as it gets closer to extinction, giving private enterprise an incentive 
for figuring out ways to increase the animal’s numbers. If the animal is not worth 
anything, or even harmful such as the mosquito, then it will be left to dwindle. One 
obvious objection is the following: just because an animal is not economically 
beneficial, don’t we still have a responsibility to save it? The market gives us the 
answer. If people truly feel a responsibility and that it is worth it to keep the species 
alive, then they will create a demand for that creature. That demand will lead to the 
incentives to safeguard it.  
 Therefore, if there is no demand, even among those who believe in saving 
nearly all species, then that would clearly be a signal that this species is not worth the 
resources to save. Only species that are truly harmful, or those whose extinction 
would not have negative effects, would be allowed to go extinct in the free market. 
 Consider the Asian elephant in Africa. Their population has dwindled in the 
last few decades due to loss of habitat and poaching. The government solution, which 
proved ineffective, was to give them large land reserves. According to Math Bench 
Biology Modules, 
To the people living around them, elephants are a nuisance, or worse. 
Elephants trample crops, dwellings, and even humans, and they can make it 
through most fences (unless the fences are electrified). One elephant can 
devour a family’s entire food supply in a single night.  
 
The situation improved, however, when communities were allowed to own the 
elephants. Although not privately owned by a company or individual, the communal 
ownership at least gave some market incentives to preserve these creatures. It was 
used to promote ecotourism which helped the community. This led to more 
privatization schemes. It would be much better to allow full ownership as that would 
then create the optimal market conditions which would lead to the most efficient 
outcome. 
 Allowing the market to take over aligns the incentives of everyone involved in 
the right direction. Elephant tusks are prized by many people around the world. If 
private entrepreneurs were able to farm and sell them they would have huge 
incentives to increase the number of elephants just as in the case of cows. 
 A free market approach to species extinction is the best way to solve the 
                                                                                                                                            
stupid or more dangerous way of making decisions than by putting those decisions in the hands of 
people who pay no price for being wrong” 
(http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/t/thomas_sowell.html). 
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problem (Simmons & Kreuter, 1989). It allows for the optimal amount and extent of 
species by mobilizing the profit-and-loss system. Privatization of endangered animals 
is the best solution to species extinction available to us. 
 
 In Section II, we argue that the Endangered Species Act places animals in 
danger. Section III is devoted to an analysis of private property rights, the sine qua 
non of saving species. We conclude in Section IV. 
 
The Endangered Species Act: Placing Animals in Danger 
 When the Endangered Species Act of 1973 was passed under the Nixon 
administration, it became one of the most polarizing laws ever written, sparking 
conflicts between environmentalists and free-marketers. As with many federal policies 
pertaining to animal welfare, it has been a complete failure. The unintended 
consequences of the Endangered Species Act have been significant. The law has 
managed to do more harm than good. There have been deleterious effects inflicted on 
humans, as well as on the very species the law was presumably intended to protect. 
 At the heart of the debate is the question of who should conserve and protect 
endangered species. The most common opinion is that it is the government’s 
responsibility to ensure the protection of species and land. For this reason, many 
government agencies have been created based on the Endangered Species Act. They 
continue to spawn as anti-market environmentalism becomes increasingly important 
in today’s world. These agencies are in charge of regulating private businesses and 
their interactions with the environment in the hopes of conserving the land and 
precluding commerce. Also, they are entrusted with the duty of monitoring the 
number of endangered species and enforcing laws meant to pave the way for their 
sustainability. 
 In contrast, in our view is that endangered species would be best preserved if 
left up to profit-and-loss mechanisms and private property rights. Some recent 
examples indicate that private property rights do indeed benefit animals. A market 
uninterrupted by the government would be more effective in protecting species than 
any federal law. Such legislation as the Endangered Species Act undermines 
fundamental private property rights and leads to various unintended deleterious 
consequences.4 
 The second part of the debate centers on the claim that the environment is 
being harmed when private interest run counter to the interest of the environment due 
to firms pursuit of short-term profit maximization. This argument is made by the 
supporters of environmental laws, who suggest that the only way to protect the 
environment is by restricting, if not outright preventing, the usage of the land by 
businesses, as well as by enforcing a set of rules on owners of land where endangered 
species are found. 
 Not surprisingly, the very opposite is true. The motivations of businesses are 
not short-term profits, but instead maximizing net present discounted value created 
from resources. The free market will allow businesses to use resources most 
productively, which will then lead supply and demand to dictate the value of these 
                                                 
4One such phenomenon is known as sss: “shoot, shovel and shut up.” If an endangered species 
is found on an owner’s land, and he is foolish enough to reveal this to the EPA, they will in effect 
virtually nationalize his property, in a misguided effort to save these animals. Far better to align the 
landowner’s interest in the very opposite direction. If a group such as Ducks Unlimited, or Western 
Wilderness Concept, will pay this person to maintain the habitat, he will have an incentive to do so, and 
Smith’s (1776) “invisible hand” will be aimed more properly. 
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uses. This process will actually cause resources to have a much longer lifespan and 
will also keep them from disappearing. Business motivations will prevent companies 
from harming the environment, and those that do will pay the consequences in the 
market. 
 
Overview of Endangered Species Act of 1973 
 It is important to outline the reasons behind the law’s passing and some 
specific provisions in order to have a better understanding of the controversial Act, 
which is enforced by the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the U. S. National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries Service. The stated objective of 
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 is: 
... to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered 
species and threatened species depend may be conserved, to provide a 
program for the conservation of such endangered species and 
threatened species, and to take such steps as may be appropriate to 
achieve the purposes of the treaties and conventions set forth in 
subsection (a) of this section.  
This mission statement plainly illustrates the goal of using the government and several 
of its agencies to take control of the environmental issues facing the country.  
 Perhaps the most controversial parts of the legislation are those that list the 
government’s power when an endangered species is known to live in a certain area or 
migrates to a new area. These provisions are outlined in Sections 4 and 9, and state 
that if an endangered species is found and listed on a piece of land, the Secretary of 
Agriculture can determine if that piece of land is a “critical habitat” for the species 
and then issue regulations the landowners must follow. If these regulations are 
violated, the landowners can face criminal charges. Specifically, Middleton (2011) 
explains: 
Section 9 is arguably the most powerful provision of the ESA, as it 
prohibits all persons and agencies from taking (generally speaking, to 
harm or kill) threatened and endangered species, without 
exception.  Those who take a species in violation of Section 9 face civil 
and criminal penalties, including civil fines of up to $25,000 per 
violation, as well as criminal penalties of up to $50,000 and 
imprisonment for one year. (n.p.)  
These harsh provisions have sparked the debate over the legitimacy of the entire Act, 
as well as given its opponents evidence and examples of its ineffectiveness. 
 
Claims to Support the Endangered Species Act 
 The “eco-friendly” movement was already an important aspect of American 
culture in the 1970s when the Act was passed, and it has been growing at a rapid rate 
ever since. The main culprit for the extinction of species, according to left-wing 
environmentalists, is mankind. More specifically, businesses and their use of natural 
resources have led to many species becoming endangered or extinct. An obvious 
indication of how the lawmakers at the time felt about free enterprise can be seen in 
one of the very first statements in the Act, which states, “The Congress finds and 
declares that various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have 
been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and development 
untempered by adequate concern and conservation”. In other words, advances in 
technology and, therefore, more productivity are placing these animals at risk. In 
Citizens Guide to the Endangered Species Act, Matsumoto et al. share the same 
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thoughts: 
Humans have caused or hastened extinctions—through habitat 
destruction, overhunting, and the introduction of non-native 
creatures—for at least 20,000 years. But things are different now. 
Humans have eclipsed all other influences and are causing extinctions 
at a catastrophic and utterly unprecedented pace, variously estimated 
by researchers at between a thousand and ten thousand times the 
natural rate. Many species—no one knows how many—are being 
extinguished even before they are discovered.  
 According to Cheater (2012), 99% of the over 2,000 species listed on 
the endangered species list since the Act was passed have avoided extinction.5 
In the same report, the group pleads that humans have caused extinction of an 
incredibly large number of species, and that we must uphold the Act’s 
provisions in order to stop big businesses from further destroying the natural 
ecosystem. The report also lists 13 current bills that are being pushed by 
lawmakers all over the United States that would “undermine the Endangered 
Species Act and its ability to protect our nation’s imperiled wildlife”. 
 
Free-Market Rebuttal 
 As with most government regulation, supposed good intentions coupled with 
poor reasoning lead to many negative unintended consequences. In the case of the 
Endangered Species Act, it ends up hurting species along with people. More 
specifically, it converts the animals into enemies of humans. The main problem is that 
the government has overlooked an incentive problem when implementing the 
Endangered Species Act because it ignores the importance of private property rights. 
 There are two main problems with the way species are dealt with in the world. 
The first involves the problem of the tragedy of the commons, where lack of 
ownership of species has caused their demise. The second is the regulation sent down 
from governments that are falsely believed to be a benefit to animals, but in fact harm 
them. Fortunately, the free market can solve both problems. The tragedy of the 
commons problem can best be illustrated by the story of the buffalo in America. Until 
the latter part of the 19th century, the buffalo population was, for the most part, safe 
from any real threat of becoming endangered. What happened during and after this 
period and its implications have been a highly debated issue. The supporters of 
government regulation see the result of the situation as a failure of the market. One 
pro-regulation thinker writes, “Using crude 19th century technology, American traders 
managed to kill roughly 15 million gigantic animals in less than two decades” 
(Merchant, 2011,). He later adds: 
Why did we all up and decide that it was time to do our damnedest to 
drive species to the brink of extinction? Well, no particular person did any 
such thing: it was the free market that made the decision.  
Merchant’s conclusion is that the technological advances in the tanning industry that 
allowed for the use of buffalo’s tough hide created a demand high enough to cause the 
extinction of the species. Storbek (2011) echoes Merchant, “The most important 
                                                 
5 Lomborg (1998, 249) explains how the success of the Endangered Species Act that its 
supporters have been touting is inflated. He notes the fact that many of the animals on the list that have 
been removed were actually a result of other factors, such as the removal of DDT saving many species 
of birds. Also, there are a large number of animals that are added to the list, and then removed after it 
has been found that the animals were never endangered in the first place. The U.S. Fisheries and 
Wildlife Service counts these species when calculating the Act’s progress. 
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driver of the extinction of the American bison was technical innovation, globalization 
and unfettered capitalism.” In his paper, Taylor (2007) offers a thesis that there are  
 
Three conditions are jointly necessary and sufficient to explain the time 
pattern of buffalo destruction witnessed in the nineteenth century. 
These are: (1) a price for buffalo products that was largely invariant to 
changes in supply; (2) open access conditions with no regulation of the 
buffalo kill; and (3), a newly invented tanning process that allowed 
buffalo hides to be turned into valuable commercial leather.   
 
All three blame market forces for the extinction of buffalo, and feed the stereotype 
that the free market is a system where short-term business interest run counter to 
species preservation. 
 Unfortunately, these writers overlook the basic economic lesson of the tragedy 
of the commons. In this scenario, a public good is used up until complete 
disappearance. This result is no anomaly and the simple solution would be to 
introduce a system of private property rights for the buffalo and all species. The 
problem with the buffalo was a lack of ownership. There was no disincentive to 
killing a buffalo, since there would be no economic cost. Thus, the marginal benefits 
exceed the marginal costs, and hunters killed with no hesitation. Had there been 
property rights, the hunters would have had to face legal punishment for their crime 
and therefore would no longer see the killing of buffalo as a net gain as the marginal 
costs of doing so now outweigh the marginal benefits.6 
 The best example of a situation that could have had the same result as the 
buffalo but instead was successful was the case of the cow. The value of cows was 
discovered before the buffalo’s, as cow meat and hide were higher in demand due to 
its ease and taste preferences. This led to a spontaneous creation of private property 
for cows that essentially prevented others from killing cows that weren’t theirs. 
Fences were built to keep the cows in one area as well as keep hunters away and, 
before fences, branding was a means of marking ownership. Any trespassing or killing 
led to the guilty party’s punishment. For this reason, the cow population has remained 
healthy and in no danger of becoming extinct. The same cannot be said for the 
buffalo, which was only recently7 privatized and was therefore a victim of tragedy of 
the commons.8 
There is of course also an economic penalty for killing a cow, but not an 
unowned buffalo. If you butcher the former, you almost certainly would have had it 
tomorrow, had you not done so. Thus, the price paid by the owner includes the entire 
value of the beast (discounted by one day’s worth of interest rate, of course). This is 
entirely absent in the case of the (unowned) bison, since if the hunter harvests this 
                                                 
6 Because the market is a human process, there are mistakes. However, these are not market 
“failures,” as many opponents would like to call them. Rather, they are mistakes made by the people 
within the market. Where the difference lies between the market and the government is the ever-
important feedback characteristic that the market possesses. In the market, if a mistake is made, the 
laws of supply and demand will bring the market back to equilibrium. This is because the market 
responds to the mistakes, corrects them, and leaves the guilty parties liable. Mistakes made by the 
government, however, do not have the same automatic feedback mechanism. If the government makes 
a mistake, it does not go out of business like a company would in free-market capitalism. It is because 
of this that the market makes fewer mistakes than the government. 
7 http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Privatization_of_wildlife; http://www.buffalogroves.com/buff-
ranch-day.html; http://alaskawildgame.makeswebsites.com/ 
8 For a critique of this doctrine, see Ostrom, 1990. For a defense of it, see Block 2011. 
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creature, the alternative cost is zero, since he would not have had it on the morrow if 
he had refrained today. The opportunity cost of killing a cow is one cow; that of the 
buffalo is zero. It is no accident that the latter was slaughtered with impunity, almost 
to extinction, while the former was preserved and protected.  
Cows are slaughtered routinely and yet are not in any danger of disappearing. 
Elephants, as far as economic theory is concerned, are only bigger cows with funny 
looking noses and ears. If harvesting them were not allowed, there would be less 
profit to be earned from them and, thus, paradoxically to economic laypeople, less 
incentive to keep them alive and thriving.  Cars, too, are traded domestically and 
internationally. If this practice were prohibited by law, the resource would be worth a 
lesser amount and would therefore be more likely to become extinct. Surely, a new 
automobile allowed by law to later on enter the used car market would be worth more 
than one precluded from such an option. Vehicles are merely elephants or cows with 
wheels attached, from a purely economic perspective. 
 Another example is that of the elephant and the threat of poaching for ivory 
trade. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES) is “An international agreement between governments. Its aim is to 
ensure that international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants does not 
threaten their survival” (CITES). The organization studies many current problems 
facing endangered species, and unfortunately suggests that stronger regulations are 
the answer for their recovery. The Endangered Species Act is not dissimilar in the 
reasoning behind CITES’ enforcement. CITES has actively monitored and attempted 
to stifle the poaching of elephants and trading of ivory all over the world, and has 
taken the stance that such trade is the culprit. 
 What the supporters of CITES do not realize is that free trade from 
privatization is the very best chance elephants have for recovery.9 Similar to the 
buffalo, the lack of ownership of elephants has caused a tragedy of the commons 
among elephants. CITES, along with the Endangered Species Act, have made it illegal 
to kill and trade elephants.10 Anderson and Leal (2001) discuss the results of the 
regulatory actions against ivory trade: 
While the ban was successful in stopping the legal trade in ivory, which 
resulted in lost revenues for local conservation efforts in African 
countries, there is little evidence that is stopped poaching … In 
Zimbabwe and Botswana, elephant populations have thrived for years 
because of successful conservation programs that capitalized on the 
legal ivory trade. In those countries, local people have a strong 
                                                 
9 The United States Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration together administer the Endangered Species Act, which has incorporated CITES. 
Perhaps, just perhaps, the real purpose of the EPA was to promote employment in these government 
bureaus. After all, if the rules it promulgated really preserved species, there would be less of a felt need 
for its continued existence. On the other hand, acting in a manner diametrically opposed to its 
presumed raison d’être would just about guarantee continued and ever perhaps expanded employment. 
“The crisis is getting more and more severe,” these bureaus might say. “Throw additional money at us 
to help us solve the problem.” Needless to say, had any private enterprise acted in this diabolical way, 
undermining its own (supposed) mission, it would be quickly and summarily bankrupted. 
10 In 1989, President of Kenya, Daniel Arap Moi, made a public cry for help by burning 12 
tons of ivory husks to bring attention to the growing poaching problem in Africa (Perlez). It seems 
counter-intuitive to burn these tusks in the first place, but it is the underlying problem that “the worry 
that tourism, which is the country’s biggest foreign-exchange earner, will fall off if the elephant 
disappears.” If Arap Moi would have allowed the elephants to be privatized, competing tourism 
companies would compete to provide the best product to their customers, which means protecting and 
taking care of their own elephants. This surely would have protected the species. 
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economic interest in protecting elephants from poaching because the 
revenue from tusks and hides and a portion of the money made from 
selling hunting permits go to local communities where the elephants 
live. It is property rights and markets that account for the rapid 
elephant population growth in Zimbabwe and Botswana and for the 
declining population in the rest of Africa.  
Property rights create an incentive to protect species. In this case, the elephant 
was the source of revenue for the local people who therefore made sure to keep their 
“golden goose” intact. This is not unlike a business selling a finished product. It 
would not make sense for that company to deplete their resources and inventory, as 
that would cause their source of profits to disappear. While the same tactic can readily 
be applied to animals, unfortunately this idea faces resistance from the 
“watermelons.”11 
 The Endangered Species Act fails to acknowledge profit incentives. The 
landowner must abide by the government rules in order to avoid harming, in any way, 
the habitat of the endangered species. This particular provision fails to account for 
such incentives. Consider the case of the red-cockaded woodpecker in North Carolina. 
Ben Cone, Jr., whose father purchased 8,000 acres of land there, replanted pines in the 
previously timberless area. Cone would burn the undergrowth in order to control it, 
and also thinned his trees every few years.12 His plan was so successful that the pines 
he planted grew to heights that were tall enough for the first time ever, to attract the 
red-cockaded woodpecker, an endangered species. This immediately brought the land 
under regulation of the Endangered Species Act, since a listed species was found on 
the property. Cone pleaded before Congress about his struggles complying with the 
stringent rules of the Act: 
By managing the property in an environmentally correct way, my 
father and I created habitat for the red-cockaded woodpecker. My 
reward has been the loss of $1,425,000 in value of timber I am not 
allowed to harvest under the provisions of the Endangered Species Act. 
I feel compelled to massively clear-cut the balance of my property to 
prevent additional loss. (Cohen) 13 
It is easy to see the problems the Act causes, as it turns the endangered species 
into enemies of the landowners. Due to the strict rules landowners must abide by if 
they want to avoid criminal charges, the government has essentially taken over private 
property. It does not make sense for the private landowner to abide by those rules if 
they unnecessarily cause them to lose money doing so. As Cone said, he has a better 
incentive to burn down his trees so that the red-cockaded woodpecker would no 
longer cause him so much financial loss. This “shoot, shovel, and shut up” mentality 
caused by the Endangered Species Act is not uncommon, and it reveals obvious 
                                                 
11Green on the outside, but red on the inside. Writers such as Brown, 1963, 1972, 1981, 2009, 
2011, 2012; Commoner, 1990; Ehrlich, 1968; Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1981; Gore, 1992; Suzuki and 
McConnell, 2007; Suzuki and McKibben, 2004; Suzuki and Hanington, 2012. 
12 He profited in two ways. First, he sold the lumber he cut down. Second, this allowed the 
remaining trees to grow faster and higher than would otherwise have been the case. 
13 What this property owner should have done, if he wanted to maintain his property values 
was “shoot, shovel and shut up.” He should have eliminated this pesky bird whether by shooting or 
poisoning. He should have then shoveled, buried it in the ground beyond the prying eyes of the EPA 
and kept his silence about these actions of his. It is a strange program (well, maybe, not so strange 
given that we are talking about government here) to safeguard species that gives land owners in out of 
the way places where they can easily get away with violating the law, incentives to regard them as 
economic vermin and exterminate them. 
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perverse human incentives. 
 Another case took place in Riverside County, California. Here the wildfire-
prone residents were prohibited from clearing firebreaks as the construction would 
disrupt the habitat of the endangered Stephens’ kangaroo rat. As expected, wildfires 
erupted and the entire area, including the residents’ homes as well as the rat’s habitat, 
was destroyed. This shows the unintended consequences that placing animals ahead of 
humans produces.14 By ignoring private property rights and incentives, the Act 
actually caused the destruction of the habitat for an endangered species it was 
supposedly trying to protect. Unfortunately, as is the usual, the government and its 
agencies were not held responsible for this debacle and were not punished for their 
mistakes. In the free market, in contrast, parties are held liable when mistakes are 
made and pay the price for their errors. 
 
Negative consequences 
 The Endangered Species Act was obviously meant to protect endangered 
species and promote their recovery. Unfortunately, the legislation has led to just about 
the opposite results. It ignores the basic economic institution of private property and 
has therefore caused a problem of tragedy of the commons among endangered 
species, such as the elephant and buffalo. However, there are solutions to the 
problems that the Endangered Species Act has overlooked. Protecting private property 
rights would give people the incentive to defend endangered species, as it would 
generate revenue for the owner. In the case of the red-cockaded woodpecker, lovers of 
this species might have agreed to pay Cone more money to grow his trees even higher, 
so as to expand their habitat (Anderson & Leal, 2001). In a sense, this would be 
“barnyardizing” the wild animal.  
 Another option would be for the government to offer various forms of 
compensation to owners of property where endangered species are found. This is the 
very opposite of current regulation, which essentially consists of the government 
seizing land without compensating the owner. Stroup (2012) states: 
One suggestion is to provide property tax credits for landowners who 
commit  
themselves to long-range habitat protection. Another is to pay 
landowners “bounties” or “rewards” for endangered species found on 
their land. Still another is to “rent” the land that is to be used for 
endangered species. All these approaches are worth considering. But 
the key change must be to remove the ability of the Fish and Wildlife 
Service to seize control of land without compensation. 
There are problems here, though. He who relies on the government to act 
rationally, to subsidize what it (presumably) wants instead of penalizing it, 
will be bitterly disappointed. If central planning of this benevolent type were 
feasible,15 we would have already achieved some measure of rationality. 
                                                 
14Rothbard (2011) wrote about an example in San Antonio, Texas, where the city was facing a 
drought, yet could not extract any water from a nearby river because it would disrupt the habitat of an 
endangered species there. Because of the strict regulations of the Act, the city had to restrict its 
residents’ water consumption. The president of the Texas and Southwestern Cattle Raisers Association, 
John W. Jones, complained, that this “puts the protection of Texas bugs before Texas babies.” It shows 
the transformation of turning endangered species into enemies that he Act will create. Privatizing the 
body of water (Motichek, Block and Johnson. 2008; Whitehead and Block. 2002; Whitehead, Gould 
and Block. 2004. ) would have solved the problem, as the market would have decided how much it 
would cost the residents to have access to water. 
15 It is not; see on this (Mises, 1922). 
Dwight Davison, Jay Mukherjee, David Simpson, Walter E. Block                                     11 
Списание „Диалог“, 2, 2014 
Socialists such as Stroup (Block, 1990) place too much faith in statism. 
The free market, if implemented, would be successful in turning endangered 
species into assets rather than debits. Compare the situation to that of oil. If a 
landowner discovers oil in his backyard, he will be certain to reap the benefits of 
owning such a wealthy piece of land. The opposite is true of the current endangered 
species laws; however, reform can improve them. 
 With a new, free market approach to the issue, the number of animals on the 
endangered list will likely decrease. The current strict regulations of the Endangered 
Species Act have managed in doing the very opposite. It is not the free market or 
capitalism that has caused species’ population to diminish or even go extinct, but 
rather both natural selection or, in recent history, the overbearing regulations issued by 
the government. 
 
Private Property Rights 
 Property rights are defined as the exclusive authority to determine how a 
resource is to be employed, regardless if that resource is owned by an individual, 
corporation, or governmental entity. Private property rights are not static, but rather 
are dynamic in the sense that they evolve through social arrangements that govern 
property ownership and allocation. As subjective measures of value increase for a 
resource, the perceived opportunity cost of losing that particular asset increases, 
which incentivizes entrepreneurs to develop mechanisms for establishing property 
rights. Under a private property system “market values of property reflect the 
preference and demands of the rest of society” which causes the use of the scarce 
resource to be “influenced by what the rest of the public thinks is the most valuable 
use (Alchian).” Demsetz (1967) argued that “property rights are an instrument of 
society and derive their significance from the fact that they help man form those 
expectations which he can reasonably hold in his dealings with others” (p. 347). As 
private property rights become more complete in the sense that there are no 
restrictions on the exclusive authority of a resource, then market exchange values 
become more influential in the use of scarce resources. “The fundamental purpose of 
property rights is that they eliminate destructive competition for control of economic 
resources” with regards to the allocation of scarce resources to those who value it the 
most (Alchian). Profit seeking ensures that property rights are allocated to the most 
valued use through Smith’s (1776) “invisible hand.” However, if the benefits of 
establishing ownership to specific property rights are relatively low compared to the 
costs, then there is little incentive to define and enforce property rights.16 With regards 
to left-wing environmental conservationists and profit-seeking entrepreneurs, the 
gains of establishing property rights are won entirely by the beneficiary and the costs 
are borne entirely by the opposite party resulting in a zero-sum game.17 
 Anti-market conservationists18 argue that environmental degradation is a 
negative externality resulting from the failure of the market to place an objective 
intrinsic value on nature which subsequently results in underpriced amenities that tend 
to be overused, causing circumstantial damage (Beder, 1997). If environmental goods, 
such as endangered species, were captured by the markets’ objective measures of 
                                                 
16 Demsetz (1967, pg. 350) stated that property rights develop to internalize externalities when 
the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization. 
17 A situation in which one participant’s gain results only from another participant’s equivalent 
loss. Therefore, the net change in total wealth among participants is zero; the wealth is just shifted from 
one to another (“Investopedia”) 
18 See footnote 10, supra 
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subjective preferences, namely prices, then the relative prices of such resources would 
provide information to the market quantifying the value of these amenities. Once 
prices are established, subjective human values are optimally revealed through human 
action in that market and participants will reveal their preference through mutually 
beneficial trades in the ex ante sense. In the absence of objective measures of 
subjective individual values, “it is a problem of utilizing knowledge not given to 
anyone in its totality” (Anderson & Leal, 2001, p. 17). 
 The debate between left-wing conservationists and profit-seeking 
entrepreneurs regarding the appropriate allocation of natural resources comes down to 
the basic categorization of environmental resources. These categories are 
commodities for commercial use to entrepreneurs, which are vastly undervalued due 
to disequilibrium conditions resulting from the lack of objective standards, and 
amenities to market critics who derive value from the fact that their ownership 
represents the option of future utility. The issue arises when market preservationists 
recognize the benefits to defining and enforcing property rights when natural animal 
resources and amenities become more valuable. The profit-seeking entrepreneurs are 
leveraged to better reveal their preference for the commodity use of the natural 
resource over the watermelon’s desire never to utilize the amenity. Continuing from 
this false assumption, these so-called naturalists will then argue that the true costs of 
public hazards, such as pollution, will not be reflected in the market prices of 
commodities because “natural systems were assumed to absorb and clean all the waste 
created” (Durajapah, 2006, n.p.).  
 When dealing with such issues, left-wing environmentalists and entrepreneurs 
differ widely. The former “prefer[s] a lower probability of environmental damage and, 
hence, higher production costs,” while entrepreneurs will “strive to keep production 
costs low, and likely lower precautionary costs and are willing to take higher risks for 
accidental damage” (Anderson & Leal, 2001, p. 76). A solution to this zero-sum game 
is that in the absence of government “picking winners,”19 private property rights will 
internalize the costs associated with the market failures and reward the most efficient 
stewards so that only the latter will receive the scarce resources. In the absence of 
well-defined property rights, the relevant tradeoffs between harvesting and exploiting 
species must be weighed by a decision maker. Moving toward free-market 
environmentalism will incentivize market participants to take into consideration the 
relevant costs associated in the decision between environmental commodities or 
amenities. Since the cost of establishing the required property rights for 
environmental resources are high, often “substitute means of control are sought” 
(Alchian). 
 An inherent issue of public resource management is that central control of the 
means of production makes it difficult to optimize the tradeoffs between watermelon 
environmentalists and entrepreneurs. This is because it assumes planners have perfect 
knowledge when in fact they are prone to sub-optimizing the allocation of scarce 
resources. Hayek (1944) stated that 
                                                 
19 Picking winners results when government measures provide direct support to industries 
beyond what the free market is willing to invest. By picking winners the government is essentially 
misallocating resources in the market as private initiatives would not provide for the required funds. 
The most famous example of picking winners was Solyndra which received a $535 million loan from 
the U.S Energy Department. The company promptly filed for bankruptcy in 2011 leaving taxpayers on 
the hook for up to $129 million (Bathon). By not allowing private capital to own hitherto “wild” 
animals such as polar bears, elephants, buffalo, etc., the government is in effect picking losers, these 
selfsame species. 
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the question raised by economic planning is, therefore, not merely whether we 
shall be able to satisfy what we regard as our more or less important needs in 
the way we prefer. It is whether it shall be we who decide what is more, and 
what is less, important for us, or whether this is to be decided by the planner. 
Economic planning would not affect merely those of our marginal needs that 
we have in mind when we speak contemptuously about the merely economic. 
It would, in effect, mean that we as individuals should no longer be allowed to 
decide what we regard as marginal. (p. 126) 
Instead, bureaucrats are incentivized to provide amenities to constituents since 
subjective values are revealed in the political system through voting. Large special 
interest groups, either environmental or entrepreneurial, spend vast funds in lobbying 
for special favors which only causes redistribution rather than the creation of wealth. 
Ultimately, this can prove to be costly to both tax payers and the environment as 
bureaucrats with multiple constituents will undoubtedly create “a battle ground where 
the developmental interests are pitted against the environmental interest in a zero-sum 
game (Anderson & Leal, 2001, tba). As endangered species are controlled by the 
political sector, environmentalists must compete against entrepreneurs who receive 
subsidies or tax breaks for the procurement of such environmental resources. 
Nevertheless, the reverse is also true. The private sector must compete with a supplier 
of recreational environmental amenities that do not face the discipline of profit and 
losses.  
 The incentives structures of the political controller will less likely be inclined 
toward efficiency as the nature of government is to externalize losses and internalize 
gains even though the political sector is typically assumed to be looking out for the 
public’s best interest. Thus, the case for ownership remains unclear when defined by 
the political sphere. One such reason is that instead of “establishing a legal system of 
rights which can be modified by transactions on the market, the government may 
impose regulations which state what people must or must not do” (Coase, 1960, p. 
11). According to Coase (1960): 
The government is, in a sense, a superfirm since it is able to influence the use 
of factors of production by administrative decisions. But the ordinary firm is 
subject to checks in the operations because of the competition of other firms, 
which might administer the same activities at lower cost and also because 
there is always the alternative of market transactions as against organization 
within the firm if the administrative costs become too great. The government is 




If there is one point we can take away from the above remarks, it is this: 
privatization is the last best hope for the survival of endangered species. It may have 
been too expensive to employ private property rights when there was no scarcity of 
the elephant, rhino, buffalo, etc., but as these resources became more and more 
valuable, in the ordinary course of events, were the market left to its own devices,20 
these species would have naturally come under the aegis of private ownership. 
However, the government, with its regulatory bureaus, its CITES conventions, froze 
us into a tragedy of the commons with regard to these animals. Only a radical move 
                                                 
20 All too often, political jurisdictions enacted legislation explicitly prohibiting hitherto 
unowned animal resources from coming under the rubric of private property ownership. This weakens 
the applicability of the Demsetz explanation. 
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toward private property can safeguard these natural resources. 
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